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Nemecko-poľské vzťahy sú formované rôznymi fázami evolúcie, 
ovplyvnenými tak negatívnymi historickými skúsenosťami, ako aj politickým 
a ekonomickým vývojom v Európe. Z dôvodu rozdielov v národných 
záujmoch, ako aj v pozíciách oboch štátov v NATO a EÚ, je možné sledovať 
zásadné diskrepancie v ich bilaterálnej kooperácii. Článok má za cieľ 
identifikovať hlavné sporné body v nemecko-poľských záujmoch nielen 
výlučne na bilaterálnej úrovni, ale aj na úrovni multilaterálnej v rámci 
európskych záležitostí. Článok sa pokúsi odpovedať na hlavnú výskumnú 
otázku: „Správa sa Nemecko voči Poľsku v definovaných oblastiach 
kooperácie ako ideálna civilná mocnosť?“3 
Kľúčové slová: utečenecká kríza, energetická spolupráca, otázky minulosti, 
Východné partnerstvo 
 
German-Polish relations have undergone various phases of evolution, 
influenced both by negative historical experiences and political and economic 
developments in Europe. Due to differences in national interests and the 
positions of the two countries in Europe and Nato, some discrepancies do 
appear in the course of their cooperation. This article identifies the main 
disputed issues in German-Polish relations linked with both European policy 
and purely bilateral matters stemming from the context of the negative 
experiences of World War II. The article then attempts to answer the primary 
research question: “In defined areas of cooperation, does Germany treat 
Poland as an ideal civilian power?“ 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
When analysing the bilateral relations between Poland and Germany, the wider 
European context must be considered. Since Poland’s EU integration, changes can be 
observed in German-Polish cooperation, in consequence of the different expectations 
and interests of the two partners. On the one hand, the influence of international 
events, such as the Iraq war, is manifest; on the other, the roles of the two central 
European countries have undergone a profound change. By integrating into the EU and 
Nato, Poland assumed the role of an equal partner to Germany, having abandoned the 
role of an applicant for support, as had typically been the case throughout the 1990s 
during Poland’s political and economic transformation, when the country aspired to 
become a member of trans-Atlantic organisations (Malinowski 2013). Germany 
probably underestimated Poland and its different, particular interests that stem from its 
geographical position. It lies on the EU’s periphery, close to Russia and other countries 
that emerged out of the former Soviet Union, notably Ukraine. At the same time, 
Germany and Poland sought to project their relationship as close, similar to that 
between Germany and France. But even the trilateral cooperation of the “Weimar 
Triangle” did not confirm German-Polish relations as close (Reiter 2003). German-
Polish cooperation is influenced not just by the European context, but by the foreign-
policy priorities of the successive governments on both sides (Lada 2011),4 which have 
caused multiple issues in this relationship. Although relations improved when the two 
governments adopted a joint statement in 2011 on the twentieth anniversary of the 
German-Polish Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation (Malinowski 
2013),5 multiple problems and disproportionalities persist. 
4 As Gerhard Schröder’s government came to office in Germany in the late 1990s, there was  
a renewed mistrust of Germany in Poland, especially due to fear that the concept of 
“Sonderweg”, or separate path, was returning to Germany’s foreign policy, a concept that led 
Germany to pursue its own national interests within the EU and to refuse to support the USA in 
the Iraq intervention. Poland responded by adopting a strictly disapproving approach towards 
negotiations concerned with the EU constitution. By contrast, under Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk Poland returned to the role of a responsible and constructive partner, active in negotiating 
financial and economic matters, as well as supporting deeper European integration. At that time 
the prevailing public opinion was that German-Polish cooperation in the EU was indispensable 
(Lada 2011). 
5 The two partners pledged to improve the situation of Polish-born German citizens and Polish-
speaking inhabitants of Germany. They also agreed to closer cooperation within European 
projects and initiatives, including full implementation of the Euro-Plus Pact and a strengthening 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, 
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This article aims to identify the main issues in German-Polish cooperation, 
both those linked with European policy and the particular issues stemming from the 
context of the negative experiences of World War II. The article then attempts to 
answer the primary research question: “In defined areas of cooperation, does Germany 
treat Poland as an ideal civilian power?” Methodologically this analysis relies on the 
fundamental premises of the civilian power concept. Support for democratisation, good 
governance and dissemination of democratic principles and universal values are 
considered as the main characteristics of a civilian power. It is in the interests of such  
a power to cooperate with its partners in the military domain, not just regionally or 
bilaterally, but in particular multilaterally, within international organisations such as 
the UN, Nato and the EU. A civilian power is even willing to support the increase of 
its partners’ military capacities in order to maintain peace and stability. Military power 
can only be used in accordance with international law, as a measure of last resort, if 
every possible diplomatic attempt to resolve a conflict has proven ineffectual. In terms 
of the economy, a civilian power supports efficient structures and the market economy, 
and makes use of the benefits created by free trade. Hence it is in its interests to seek 
closer integration, helping to liberalise trade and remove trade barriers between 
partners (Maull 1999, Maull 2000, Kříž 2007, Kříž-Urbanovská 2014). Should be 
established that Germany’s political behaviour towards Poland does not correspond to 
the civilian power concept, two more concepts, namely a trade state6 and a middle 
power7 will be considered. 
 
including increasing EU military capacities, and support for the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, with an emphasis on Eastern Partnership (Malinowski 2013). 
6 A trade state is primarily oriented towards the affluence and prosperity of the country as  
a whole and especially its population, and this is prioritised in any foreign-policy disputes. As 
with a civilian power, it is in a trade state’s interest to resolve any conflict peacefully and to 
cooperate internationally on creating and maintaining peace. According to Michael Staack, the 
main rationale for such actions and for such a state’s interest in peaceful conflict resolution, in 
cooperation and in balancing the interests of various states through multilateral cooperation is 
the trade state’s awareness that trade and prosperity can be most consistently developed in  
a peaceful international environment, regionally as well as globally, but particularly in a world 
economic system based on liberal values and principles (Staack 2013, p. 1). Similarly scholarly 
literature encounteres multiple arguments that confirm the primary interests of trade states and 
their efforts to liberalise trade and achieve an open economic environment, which should 
prevent any conflicts or wars (Mansfield- Pevehouse 2000, p. 2). 
7 States are qualified as middle powers on the basis of either their capacities and capabilities, or 
their behaviours. Be that as it may, many authors agree that a middle power is located between 
a great power and a small state; it has at its disposal certain power, both material and non-
material, that is greater than that of a small state but smaller than that of a great power. In 
consequence of this a middle power is unable to influence international relations on its own. Its 
power is insufficient to do that; rather, what is expected is that it would be able to establish 
itself in a regional context, where it can act as a dominant power, determining the relations 
between the actors of the region. The relative power ranking of a state is important for the 
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In order to identify the main disputes in the German-Polish cooperation and 
the German foreign policy behavior as well 35 interviews were conducted with 
German policy-makers as well as foreign and security policy experts. Ten out of the 
total number of interviews were conducted with members of the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) in the period between March and July 2015, ranging across a wide 
spectrum of German political parties. The remaining interviews were with members of 
the German and Polish foreign and security policy community, and were conducted in 
the period from October 2017 to September 2018. This group is represented by experts 
of the European Council on Foreign Relation Berlin, the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP), the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Bundeswehr University Munich, the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation Berlin, the Hanns Seidel Foundation Munich, Centre for 
Eastern Studies (OSW) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). 
 
2 THE MAIN POINTS OF DIVERGENCE IN GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS 
 
2.1 THE ENERGY POLICY 
The energy issue is a critical aspect of German-Polish relations. It is linked 
with both the German concept of “Energiewende”, or energy transition, and with the 
differing positions the two countries take on European energy policy. 
First we need to consider that Germany’s energy policy is based on support for 
renewable resources and a gradual retreat from nuclear power. Germany set itself the 
goal that “in the future energy mix, renewable resources will provide the greatest part” 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2010, p. 3). Poland views 
“Energiewende” as contrary to its interests. Like other countries of the Visegrád 
Group, it supports renewable resources, but proposes that their share of the energy mix 
should be a minimum of 27%, whereas Germany strictly demands a minimum of 30% 
(Uken 2014). The two countries consider the proportion of renewable sources in the 
energy mix an important issue, as this is a matter of common agreement among EU 
member states; but in ensuring energy security, there are other energy sources that also 
play a key role, above all nuclear energy and coal, which particularly dominates 
Poland’s energy policy (Mišík 2013a). Poland is pushing for the constituents of the 
energy mix to be a matter solely for nation states (Records of interviews at the Centre 
for Eastern Studies (OSW) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) 
2018). According to Poland and its Central European partners, the energy mix must 
reflect national characteristics, which are key for ensuring energy security. Common 
 
overall conceptualisation of a middle power: such a power adjusts its behaviour to the relative 
balance of power in the system (Gecelovsky 2009, Ungerer 2007, Cooper- Higgot- Nossal 
1993, Cooper 2013). 
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rules governing the energy mix, as presented by Germany and others, are seen in 
Poland as pressure exerted by some EU member states not to use certain energy 
sources (Mišík 2013a). In its energy mix, Germany focuses on developing biofuels and 
wind power, thus creating pressure on Polish and Czech transmission networks. 
Germany’s intention to shut down all its nuclear power plants by 2032 is narrowly 
linked with this. In terms of developing transmission networks, Germany’s policy 
seems strongly one-sided and focused on promoting the country’s own interests in 
implementing its “Energiewende” project; German policy is thus affecting its 
neighbours and other countries in Central Europe (Mišík 2013b).8 
What is crucial in energy matters from the viewpoint of Poland and other three 
Visegrád Group countries is that an Energy Union is the chief goal of contemporary 
German foreign policy, and it might guarantee energy security on the European 
continent. The EU’s Energy Union necessitates the unanimity of all member states and 
the EU must act as a joint negotiator with third parties, including Russia (Nosko-Thim 
2011). Germany’s fundamental vision is to provide sufficient energy interconnections 
between all EU members and to implement important energy projects that would 
guarantee the EU’s independence from importing energy raw materials. The country 
emphasises in this context that energy diversification is needed.9 Despite this, 
8 The development of transmission networks in Germany negatively influences its neighbouring 
countries, as theirs are overloaded largely by cross-border lines, which means greater losses in 
electricity transmission and hence a negative influence on the prices paid for electricity by 
domestic customers. Also, national transmission system operators are unable to perform agreed 
international electricity trades as their systems are overloaded. Several measures have been 
adopted to deal with the problems that arise, such as a compensation mechanism that applies at 
the EU level which, however, is insufficient. Acting under the influence of these negative 
externalities, Germany started bilateral talks with its neighbours, with the aim of establishing 
more efficient regulation of the amount of electricity allowed through the network, with 
advantages for both Germany and the Visegrád Group. A result of these negotiations was the 
construction of “phase-shifting transformers” at German borders, which are able to regulate the 
amount of electricity allowed through, and hence to protect the transmission networks. This was 
agreed by Germany and Poland. Together the Visegrád Group countries seek to achieve change 
and to exert pressure on Germany at the EU level. The Germans believe that the solution is 
further development of infrastructure, in particular, a “smart grid”, which is better able to 
respond not just to the demand but also to the supply of energy (Mišík 2013b). 
9 Germany’s former foreign minister and current Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
sees the options for diversification in, on the one hand, a focus on other suppliers, notably 
Asian countries, and, on the other, in support for shale gas, which will increase the 
competitiveness of countries that have such reserves. The common energy policy has as its aim 
to mitigate tensions in energy relations between states by implementing a resistant contractual 
scheme interlinking supply, transit and consumer countries on the basis of exactly stipulated 
rules as well as a mechanism for resolving any potential situations of crisis and conflict. This 
should prevent the current use by certain countries (for example, Russia in the context of the 
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Germany is also the main advocate of constructing the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, 
arguing that this is a largely economic and not a political project, though most EU 
member states led by Central European countries – Poland in particular – see it as 
deeply political. With Nord Stream 2 operational, Russia’s Gazprom’s share of the 
German energy market would rise from 40% to 60%. Germany emphasises that the 
construction can only go ahead as long as Russia adheres to its commitment, namely 
that even after 2019 it would not stop supplies of gas to Central Europe via Ukraine. 
Germany rejects the criticism voiced by its European partners, who have argued that 
Nord Stream 2 would increase EU energy dependency on Russia, and that a European 
energy union would not be created (Bota- Krupa- Thumann 2016). Poland sees Nord 
Stream 2 as a threat to its energy security, which is linked to Ukraine’s energy security 
and risks to transit routes. The country calls for the diversification not just of energy 
routes but also of energy sources, relying again on cooperation with the USA, which is 
interested in exporting its gas to Europe. This means that in the further development 
and discussions of Nord Stream 2, the position taken by the USA will play  
a fundamental role, as the latter country could block the project and impose sanctions 
on European energy firms cooperating with Gazprom. Poland has also showed interest 
in closer cooperation with Denmark on the Northern Gateway gas pipeline project. In 
negotiations over halting the Nord Stream 2 project, Poland cannot rely on the support 
of other Central European countries, which are passive on this matter and seek other 
alternatives for diversification (Records of interviews at the OSW and the PISM 2018). 
 
2.2 EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 
Polish and German interests also diverge somewhat with respect to the Eastern 
Partnership project. The aim of the German government is to gain greater influence 
over Polish interests in the Eastern Partnership policy and its implementation within 
the EU framework, that is, to harmonise Poland’s geopolitical aspirations with the 
German position on the EU’s Eastern policy. To date, Germany has been inclined 
largely to support the Eastern Partnership project because thanks to its Eastern policy 
the EU can develop its capabilities to act beyond its borders and over and above what 
was previously possible (Węc 2009, p. 163). 
Germany’s interest in stabilising the Eastern European region and the EU’s 
external border must be understood primarily with respect to the country’s export-
oriented economy – that means with respect to a trade state, a position assumed by 
Germany vis-à-vis Eastern European countries. From Germany’s point of view, what is 
needed is the introduction of instruments of support for Eastern Partnership countries, 
including free-trade zones, agreements on deeper and more comprehensive 
 
conflict in Ukraine) of energy and energy supplies as instruments to pursue their own political 
and foreign-policy objectives (Steinmeier 2014). 
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cooperation, the implementation of public administration reforms and the development 
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with an emphasis on disseminating and 
sharing common values such as democracy, freedom and human rights. Germany 
welcomes the Eastern Partnership initiative – a product of Polish-Swedish cooperation 
– but key tasks in the region include, on the one hand, ensuring German economic 
prosperity in the region of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus by creating appropriate 
conditions there for trading with these countries, and, on the other, maintaining stable 
relations with Russia, which has its own specific position – and its own interests – in 
the region (Handl 2011, p. 375). 
Germany is concerned that too much support for the Eastern Partnership 
project would be viewed negatively by Russia as an attempt: to exclude Russia from  
a privileged partnership with the EU; to prevent the signing of an exclusive 
Modernisation Pact; and especially to intervene in the Russian sphere of interest. The 
problem is that Chancellor Merkel’s government lacks engagement and interest in 
Eastern policy (Meister 2011); some scholars have even described Germany’s policy 
towards Eastern Partnership countries as passive.10 They recommend closer and 
stronger cooperation between Germany and Poland, the initiator of the Eastern 
Partnership project and currently its greatest advocate. A combination of Polish and 
German interests would improve the efficiency of actions so far implemented and 
would win support from other EU members for the project, as well as from the 
majority necessary for the successful formation of EU foreign policy (Meckel et al. 
2012). However, Germany confirms the conservative modus of its foreign policy, 
seeking to avoid antagonism not just in its bilateral relations with Russia but also in 
EU-Russian relations. Germany is not interested in developing the Eastern Partnership 
to the extent of its six partner countries acquiring full EU membership; rather its 
primary interest in Eastern policy is to develop bilateral relations with countries in the 
region at a level that will bring significant political and economic benefits to Germany. 
Eastern European countries are attractive to Germany: for its exports and investment; 
for their economic growth and the growth of their domestic demand; for their cheap 
labour, geographical proximity and cultural links; and, last but not least, because 
German firms have improved their knowledge of the region and its specifics. Although 
10 A similar scenario of German passivity unfolded at a 2015 Eastern Partnership summit in 
Riga, which was crucial in terms of articulating the aims of EU foreign policy towards Eastern 
European states. The summit examined Russia’s aggressive policy in the region, specifically, 
the pressure exerted on Armenia not to sign an Association Agreement; the invasion and 
annexation of Crimea; the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbass; and also the prevailing 
instability in Moldova and the new foreign-policy orientation of Belarus. It was expected of 
Germany – currently the strongest European economy and EU leader in sanctions policy against 
Russia – to take the lead at the negotiations and push new political ideas into the EU’s Eastern 
policy (Gressel 2015, pp. 5-7). 
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Eastern Europe is important for the German economy, from a political perspective one 
may expect that the country will oppose the region’s full integration into the EU 
(Gotkowska 2010). 
On the basis of the above we note that Germany plays a specific role in 
Eastern Partnership policy. In certain respects it acts as a middle power, as an agenda 
setter – for example, in negotiating the Minsk Agreement between Ukraine and Russia 
in a “Normandy format”, alongside France (Record of interview with a Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung expert 2017, Record of interview with a Bundeswehr University 
professor 2018). But Germany also acts as a trade state, pursuing its own economic 
interests and seeking deeper economic cooperation with Eastern partners. Germany 
thus seeks to maintain the status quo in European neighbourhood policy (Pond-
Kundnani 2015).  
In Poland a different approach can be observed, since the creation of this 
initiative in EU foreign policy has been a Polish priority since 2003. At that time, the 
EU did not have a clear policy towards its new eastern neighbours and in 2003 the 
European neighbourhood policy was only in the first stage of its development; hence it 
was apparent that by acceding to the EU Poland would be able to fill this vacuum. 
Poland was also aware that it could use EU foreign policy to enlarge its own influence 
both in the Union and among its eastern neighbours, by assuming the role of an expert 
on the East and a promoter of democracy. It has been able to make use of external 
conditions – the Orange Revolution, the war in Georgia, the conflict over gas supplies 
and the Ukrainian crisis – to establish closer relations with the former Soviet republics, 
providing support for the transformation processes unfolding in these countries with 
the ultimate goal of their full integration into the EU. Although Poland’s engagement 
in Eastern policy has been undeniable, progress has been slow, for multiple reasons. 
First, sufficient support from other European partners, notably Germany and France, 
was absent; Germany emphasised the development of the “Black Sea Synergy” 
initiative, started in 2007, while France focused on its Union for the Mediterranean 
project, aiming for closer cooperation with the EU’s southern neighbours. Second, 
pressures both internal and external to which the EU had to respond – the rejection of 
the Lisbon Treaty by France and the Netherlands; budget problems; efforts to maintain 
geopolitical stability and security on the European continent, including balancing the 
powers and spheres of influence of the EU and Russia; the threat of increased 
migration from Eastern Partnership countries; the risks of changes to borders; and 
increasing internal crime – all led to reticence in the EU’s position towards the Eastern 
dimension of its neighbourhood policy. Third, Poland failed to present a clear, 
constructive and strategic vision of Eastern policy and of its own role in its 
implementation, in consequence of which the foci of such a policy were limited to its 
two chief aims, that is, support for democratisation and transformation of the Eastern 
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neighbours. Last but not least, Poland itself faced pressures; on the one side, from 
Russia and the latter country’s rejection of European countries’ engagements in 
Georgia and Ukraine; on the other, from its European partners, who expected Poland to 
act as an agenda setter for Eastern Partnership policy, to make use of its experience 
with democratisation and transformation processes and to apply this experience 
successfully in Eastern European states. Close and strong relations with Eastern 
partners, as well as historical and cultural links, complicated Poland’s task of balancing 
its EU commitments with support for Eastern European countries in the process of 
their democratisation (Kaminska 2014, pp. 141-147). 
The question today is to what extent will the changes in Poland’s political 
direction influence its interest in supporting the Eastern Partnership project? So far it 
seems that Poland remains committed to the project, viewing it as a success of EU 
foreign policy. Warsaw has long strongly supported the democratisation and 
Europeanisation of Eastern European states, with the stabilisation of the region and 
security guarantees being the main factors of Polish engagement (Plachciak-Zielinska 
2015). Taking into consideration the specific forms of Polish cooperation with Eastern 
European countries, we note efforts in developing bilateral relations, as well as 
multilateral relations within the EU, in the following areas: improvements to 
democracy and governance; better border management; agricultural and rural 
development; and entrepreneurship initiatives. Multilateral cooperation is based on 
joint projects, funded by international organisations which provide development 
grants, specialised institutions and programmes (Record of interview with a 
programme worker of the research institute of the German Association for 
International Affairs 2015).11  
As far as the implementation of the Eastern Partnership policy by Poland and 
Germany is concerned, it is true that the two countries share an interest in developing 
favourable relations between the EU and Eastern European countries; but the problem 
remains of the degree of engagement of the two countries in Eastern policy, as well as 
the inability of European states hitherto to find a suitable strategy for stabilising the 
11 Specific projects in Armenia and Azerbaijan are focused on supporting disadvantaged 
groups, environmental protection and agricultural and rural development. In Belarus, support is 
also given to disadvantaged groups as well as independent media, civil society initiatives, youth 
and education. In Georgia, the programme focuses on disadvantaged groups, regional 
development, strengthening of public administration and local government, while in Moldavia 
and Ukraine, support is focused on public safety, protection of borders, regional development, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, job creation and, similarly to Georgia, strengthening 
public administration and local government. Poland has kept its role of a leading international 
donor for development targets in Eastern Partnership countries (Record of an interview with a 
programme worker of the research institute of the German Association for International Affairs 
2015). 
 
Journal of International Relations, 2019, no. 3 ○ 197 
 
different political systems in Eastern Europe, for their democratisation and for 
strengthening economic relations (Malinowski 2013, p. 92). Eastern policy is an area 
in which potential close and deep German-Polish cooperation ought to be realised most 
conspicuously and consistently. However, the present developments in relations 
between the two countries, as well as the presence of more serious problems at the 
European and international levels, does not suggest that clear-cut joint solutions will be 
found for Eastern Partnership policy, nor that cooperation between Germany and 
Poland in this area will become closer. 
 
2.3 SECURITY 
Security and defence are other areas in which the differing Polish and German 
positions and views are apparent. This is largely linked with their differing views of 
what the security issues are, and a misunderstanding on the part of Germany of 
Poland’s demands in the context of threats and hazards. 
These differences are due to the two countries’ geographic positions in Europe 
and their perception of security threats and risks. On the one hand, we have a Germany 
surrounded by stable, democratic states, in which the risk of major domestic political 
change is minimal (Malinowski 2013). Nor does Germany feel threatened by more 
distant influences such as Russia’s aggressive policy or the unstable situations in the 
Middle East or Africa (Gotkowska 2018, p. 12); as such it refuses to strengthen the 
presence of Nato or US military units in Europe. Rather, Germany is concerned with 
internal threats, such as terrorism and cyber terrorism, increasing cross-border crime 
and uncontrollable migration flows (Malinowski 2013). On the other hand, we have  
a Poland surrounded by unpredictable Eastern European countries and Russia’s unclear 
foreign-policy direction, in consequence of which Poland primarily relies on enhanced 
security and defence cooperation in Nato, and hence consents to a greater presence of 
US and Nato units. Crucial for Poland is close cooperation in Nato’s Eastern Flank, 
seen as proof of reinforced collective defence in the East under Nato’s patronage. In 
this context, Central European countries agreed to locate the Multinational Division 
North East (MNDNE) HQ in Elbląg, Poland; this should improve Nato’s ability to 
implement collective defence measures on the Eastern Flank (Visegrad Group 2017). 
Poland has become the main US ally on the Eastern Flank, as shown by the presence of 
around 5,000 US soldiers on Polish territory as part of rotating, mixed tactical units 
and air force units. These come under the American European Deterrence Initiative 
and USA-led combat group that are part of Nato’s deterrence policy. Poland 
demonstrates its ambition to have close and strong relations with the USA by 
increasing its capacities and by participating in combat operations by the global anti-
Isis coalition led by the USA to stabilise the Middle East (Gotkowska 2018, pp. 14-
15). 
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These factors also influence the degree of Poland’s engagement in European 
security and defence policy initiatives, such as the Pesco (Permanent Structured 
Cooperation) project, of which Germany was an initiator. Pesco is a source of 
contradictory Polish and German positions. Germany follows largely political aims in 
implementing the project, emphasising its continuous, reticent position on using 
military means to resolve conflicts and crises.12 From Germany’s viewpoint, Pesco 
was a success in that a relatively unambitious format was negotiated for cooperation 
that has political importance without entailing any agreement to fulfil strictly military 
commitments (Gotkowska 2018, p. 18). 
Poland was very sceptical of Pesco from the very beginning; fearing Russian 
aggression, the country is eminently interested in strengthening collective defence and 
reforming Nato structures. Thus it has joined only two Pesco programmes, “Military 
Mobility” (in which Germany is the leading country) and “European Secure Software-
defined Radio” (ESSOR), in which both countries participate. From the Polish 
perspective, Pesco is advantageous for developing military capacities largely within 
the framework of crisis management operations. It is beneficial to the defence 
industries of the largest participating states and focuses on threats and challenges from 
Europe’s southern neighbours, not from the East which is what matters to Poland 
(Gotkowska 2018, p. 11). 
Poland also has demands that diverge from Germany’s views on the 
“Framework Nations” concept, proposed by Germany in 2013 and adopted by Nato in 
2014. This concept is a pragmatic approach to cooperation on a voluntary basis, 
preserving full sovereignty and allowing the choice of the most suitable scenario of 
engagement for nations in coordination with Nato. The original German concept was 
based on two interlinked pillars. First, participating states can concentrate on the 
coordinated development of their capabilities in “capability clusters” in order to close 
12 Germany’s reasons for initiating Pesco were as follows: (1) it was in Germany’s interests to 
provide a positive response to French initiatives for closer European collaboration in at least 
one area and hence to demonstrate the potency of the German-French tandem in the EU. (2) 
Germany wanted to demonstrate to the new US administration that Europe was willing to 
assume greater responsibility for its security and invest more in military cooperation. (3) The 
domestic context – specifically, German popular opinion – for which a narrative of a “European 
defence union” is more palatable than strengthening Nato cooperation. Also fundamental from 
the German perspective was reinforcing industrial cooperation within the EU defence sector to 
benefit Germany’s arms manufacturers, but this cooperation will not exceed the permitted 
degree of military engagement of Germany’s Bundeswehr, especially in the Middle East and in 
Africa. Consequently, Germany initiated projects solely in non-military domains, such as 
medical support and logistics, thus becoming a leading country in four projects: “EU Medical 
Command”, “Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations”, “EUFOR Crisis 
Response Operation Core” and “EU Training Mission Competence Centre”, and a participating 
country in seven Pesco initiatives (Gotkowska 2018, p. 8). 
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their “capability gaps”. Currently the Framework Nations concept includes 16 clusters 
and each of the participating nations freely decides on its participation in the individual 
clusters. The second pillar has been described by experts as the core of a “European 
army” – an ambitious plan for structured and collaborative planning of forces under 
Germany’s leadership. It is expected that close cooperation between the armed forces 
of the states involved in the Framework Nations concept with Germany’s Bundeswehr 
will improve the fundamental interoperability of the forces and harmonise the 
development of their capabilities. Cooperation also brings options for creating 
effective multinational combat divisions around a German core. Two of these divisions 
would be formed around German divisional headquarters. This will be a multinational 
air group, which will rely on Germany for more than three-quarters of its capabilities 
(Glatz-Zapfe 2017, pp. 2-3). 
By proposing the Framework Nations concept, Germany pursued three main 
objectives. (1) It justified the maintaining of the spectrum of its capabilities and 
military structures, allowing the Bundeswehr to re-embark on a sustainability pathway 
in operations through cooperation with other armed forces. If Germany finds partners 
willing to commit to permanent and stable cooperation, it will not be able unilaterally 
to modify these international structures in the future. (2) Once the concept is 
implemented, a new level of defence planning will be achieved among states, with 
partners preparing their actions in more detailed, reliable and coordinated ways. In 
doing so they may systematically use their experience of Nato and EU operations in 
order to achieve long-term plans and preparations for the future development of their 
security-defence cooperation. (3) Germany saw the concept as an opportunity to 
present a conspicuously German initiative at the 2014 Nato summit, and thus deflect 
attention away from its reputation: that of an ally who promotes maintaining the status 
quo above everything else (Major-Mölling 2014, p. 2). 
Several aspects of the concept remain debatable. First, we might well ask to 
what extent the other partners will be willing to join the German proposal, due to 
concerns over their possibly excessive dependence on German security policy, as well 
as over Germany’s reticence in using military force and approving a mandate for 
international operations (Major-Mölling 2014, p. 3). Germany consistently advocates 
the use of military force only as a last resort, something that stems from its role as  
a civilian power. Also, at the project’s inception opinions were voiced that the German 
government was seeking to support its own defence industry through this initiative; for 
the smaller countries this implies greater dependence of their capabilities on the 
defence-industrial interests of Germany. But, for Germany too, this project brings new 
obligations, which the country will have to fulfil during its successful implementation. 
Politically, Germany needs to demonstrate its readiness to assume responsibility for 
this close form of cooperation; it must show its reliability; be able to explain its 
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decision to participate or not in particular operations; and clearly define its security-
policy objectives and the conditions under which it is willing to engage militarily. In 
legal terms, Germany must unambiguously establish whether the acceptance of such  
a close and in some cases irreversible dependence is compatible with the opinion of the 
Federal Constitutional Court with respect to the Lisbon Treaty.  
In military terms, Germany’s reticence in implementing its original ambitions 
for the project gradually has become apparent. Germany declares that this is a long-
term concept, the results of which will only become apparent in the future, and hence it 
has focused on implementing only small steps – that is, individual bilateral projects. 
Germany’s ability to integrate the concept into an EU framework – not to focus solely 
on Nato – will also prove important. Developments to date suggest that the option of 
defining military capabilities in the context of civilian instruments and industrial 
capacities in the EU goes unused. EU countries need to be ready to organise in a way 
that will be effective militarily and efficient economically (Major-Mölling 2014, p. 4). 
Although Poland joined the German concept, it expresses different demands. 
Poland together with the Baltic states ask Germany as well as other Nato member 
states for more active support in ensuring their defence and security, which they see as 
under threat from Russia’s foreign policy. Southern Nato states have an eminent 
interest in protecting their borders, which are threatened by instability and 
uncontrollable migration flows (Major-Mölling 2014, p. 1). Germany’s response to 
both demands is, again, guarded, and hence it is not realistic to expect that cooperation 
between Poland and Germany within the Framework Nations concept will become 
stronger or deeper.  
As noted by an expert of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw, 
Poland views both Framework Nations and Pesco as disrupting the balance between 
Nato and the EU in their engagement in defence and security provision in Europe. It is 
not in Poland’s interest to alter the importance of Nato’s task in providing European 
defence and security, and Poland also does not see EU initiatives that are part of the 
Common Defence and Security Policy as sufficient to achieve enhanced security and 
defence cooperation (Record of interview at the OSW 2018). 
Defence expenditure is also a disputed point in German-Polish defence and 
military cooperation. Whereas Poland has adopted a law on the reconstruction, 
technical modernisation and funding of the Polish armed forces, under which the 
Polish government pledged gradually to increase defence expenditure over the next 12 
years (2.1% of GDP in 2019; 2.2% in 2020-2023; 2.3% in 2024-2025; 2.4% in 2026-
2029; and 2.5% in 2030), which is in agreement with the Strategy for Responsible 
Development adopted by the Polish government (Defence24 2017), German political 
leaders and the expert community do not believe it is realistic to increase German 
defence expenditure to 2% of GDP. For Germany it is more important to support the 
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non-military area of defence-security cooperation than the military aspect. The popular 
opinion is that Germany does not need such strong armed forces and political leaders 
share the view that increasing German military might – making it the strongest in the 
EU – would contribute to political tensions between Germany and other EU members. 
Several security analysts note that no EU country desires a militarily strong Germany; 
hence the country will continue to promote the civilian character of its policy and non-
military security and defence objectives (Records of interviews 2017). In the spirit of 
the civilian power concept, Germany prefers a comprehensive notion of security and 
declares that investment in development aid and environmental security should be 
included in overall defence and security expenditure (von der Leyen 2018). 
This discrepancy in terms of complying with the commitment to give at least 
2% of GDP to defence is also confirmed by the table below, which compares defence 
expenditure and the size of armed forces personnel of Germany and Poland; indicating 
also the different ranking of the two countries globally. 
Despite the persistent discrepancies between Germany and Poland in the 
military-defence area, which are to some extent marked by the critical perceptions in 
Germany of Polish domestic political developments, experts agree on one thing: if 
Poland fulfils its obligations with respect to at least one of the EU initiatives in the 
defence area it has signed up to, it might become one of the key pillars of European 
defence and take advantage of the benefits of the projects in modernising the defence 
industries of member states that are worth billions of euros. Crucially for this, Poland 
must start seeing European defence initiatives as possibilities and not as threats 
(Zaborowski 2018). 
 
2.4 REFUGEE CRISIS 
How to deal with the refugee crisis? This has been another point of dispute 
between Germany and Central European countries, as Germany has failed to consider 
their position. However, this topic does not resonate as strongly in Polish domestic 
politics as it does in Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. Therefore it is only a marginal 
issue in the German-Polish political dialogue (Record of interview at the OSW 2018). 
In fact, during the initial discussions on how the refugee crisis ought to be 
resolved Poland supported Germany, voting for compulsory quotas. A change of 
government, however, also meant a change in the Polish position on the refugee issue. 
Like other Visegrád Group countries, Poland rejected compulsory quotas, maintaining 
the line with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary. In the argumentation of 
Visegrád Group countries political leaders, the refugee crisis presents significant risks 
to the current relatively stable political and security situation on the European 
continent, specifically: the risk of a negative spill-effect and the fragmentation of key 
areas of integration; risks to the Schengen area, common market and free movement of 
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people due to reinstated border controls; and concern over the gradual re-orientation of 
the EU on the refugee issue and its growing engagement in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, thus minimising the importance of other domains such as Europe’s 
Eastern policy. Visegrád Group countries see Germany’s behaviour as manifestations 
of a new European policy assertiveness and German unilateralism, analogous to its 
actions during the Eurozone crisis and in European climate policy, in which it saw its 
partners’ refusals as stubbornness and a lack of solidarity that had been repeatedly 
granted to them by the EU since their accession (Lang 2015). 
Central European states claim that they are interested in promoting the 
principle of “effective solidarity”, based on a readiness to participate in preparing 
strategies for effective and integrated development cooperation with countries of 
migration origin and transit, and consequently granting development and humanitarian 
aid to these countries. At the same time, they declare their readiness to improve the 
efficiency of bilateral and EU assistance for groups at risk in countries and regions 
threatened by conflict (Joint Communiqué of the Visegrad Group…2015). The primary 
areas of their engagement are the Balkan countries, protection of EU external borders, 
support for continuous and close dialogue with Turkey, and improving the efficiency 
of FRONTEX. Poland strictly rejects Germany’s “willkommen” policy. Polish experts 
describe this as a failure of Germany’s soft power and of Germany as a civilian power 
(Record of interview at the OSW 2018). 
 
3 DISPUTED BILATERAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS OF THE PAST AND MINORITIES 
The position of national minorities in both countries, as well as questions of 
the past, also give rise to disputes in German-Polish cooperation. The acuteness of 
these issues varies depending on the political constellation in the two countries. 
The minorities issue arises due to asymmetry between the positions of the 
German minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Germany. Supported by the 
Polish government, Polish public opinion is that the position of the Polish minority in 
Germany is much worse than that of the German minority in Poland. The Polish side 
expects the increased support of and closer cooperation with Germany’s federal states. 
In connection with the issue of the positions of minorities and lacking partnership, 
questions of the past have re-emerged and with them also a feeling of grievance on the 
Polish side. Questions of the past resonated in the German-Polish dialogue even during 
the negotiations for Poland’s accession to the EU. Poland expressed its concern over 
Germany’s attempts at revisionism and the re-appearance of German claims. This 
discord between Poland and Germany then escalated, not least due to the approach 
taken by the then German government, which did not seek to clarify the situation. The 
paternalistic approach taken towards dealing with the past and multiple communication 
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failures were accompanied by a wave of criticism voiced by the Poles (Record of 
interview at the OSW 2018). 
In 2005, another conflict flared up between the two partners, concerned with 
the planned establishment of the “Centre Against Expulsions” in Berlin. Many experts 
expressed the view that this conflict did not reflect the hitherto successful steps taken 
by both sides to mitigate the effect of negative historical experiences. In this case, the 
Poles criticised the plan to establish the Centre, arguing that Germany was seeking to 
create a new version of history, in which Germany would be depicted as victim; 
allegedly this was a prelude to compensation claims for property lost in Germany’s 
former eastern areas. In Germany, meanwhile, the impression was that Poland was not 
interested in dealing with the complex issue of the post-war expulsion of Germans, and 
that Poland even sought to prevent Germans from remembering their victims. This was 
purely a political problem – public opinion showed no particular interest in the 
expulsion question. Experts suggested that the politicising of the issue was linked with 
the different understandings of power by the two partners. Poland failed to find its 
place as a sovereign and integrated Central European country; it was unsure of its 
German partner, facilitating the political instrumentalisation of a history experienced 
by a proud but repeatedly vanquished country – the ultimate consequence of this might 
be that Poland will fail to fulfil its important role at the centre of an integrated Europe 
(Dylla-Jäger 2005). 
In addition to this the issue of war reparations, which Germany has not paid to 
Poland, has appeared in the German-Polish dialogue. Poland claims more than 840 
billion USD and does not recognise the German argument that the Polish government 
gave up reparations in 1953. The current Polish government claims that the decision to 
give up reparations in 1953 was adopted under pressure exerted by the Soviet Union 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2017). The German government is aware of its 
historical responsibility – including the moral, political and financial perspectives – but 
relies among other things upon the fact that with the adoption of the “Two Plus Four 
Agreement” in 1990 any claims connected with German war crimes during World War 
II lost their political and legal effect (Lepiarz 2018). 
Evidently, historical issues and related unbalanced relations of the past 
continue to be present in the German-Polish relationship and may encumber the extent 
and closeness of their cooperation in the coming years, unless Polish political leaders 
change their rhetoric and their approach to dealing with the past. At present, however, 
the domestic political opinion in Poland is that it is Germany’s soft power and 
diplomacy which has failed here; most notably that Germany has failed as a civilian 
power. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
We conclude that despite close economic cooperation between Germany and 
Poland and the mutual economic importance of the two countries there are disputed 
points in German-Polish relations, and that these are linked both with the form and 
strength of cooperation at the European level and with their exclusively bilateral 
aspects. One of the reasons for the disputes and divergence that appear in German-
Polish cooperation can be found in the very essence of the relationship, and in 
Germany’s relations with Central European countries generally. Germany has 
important economic and trade interests in Central Europe, which bring benefits not just 
to the Central European countries but to Germany as well, as its trade relations with 
this region are stronger than those with France or the USA. Despite the evident 
strength and importance of these economic and trade relations, so far Germany has 
failed to make use of their political potential (Records of interviews at the OSW and 
the PISM 2018). In the political area and the related security, defence and energy 
areas, Germany does not consider Central European countries as strategic partners, or 
as equal partners, and this entails certain disputed points and unresolved issues in their 
bilateral cooperation. 
We identified the first disputed area in energy policy, namely in the German 
promotion of its “Energiewende” project and Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia. 
In these cases, Germany has acted as a combined trade state and middle power. As a 
trade state, it pursues its economic interests and the affluence and prosperity of its 
population, as evident from its ambition to push through the use of renewable energy 
sources and abandon nuclear power at the European level. At the same time, the 
arguments favouring Nord Stream 2 construction are based on the premise that the 
interests involved are exclusively economic and not political. Thus Germany primarily 
pursues its economic interests and by supporting trade with Russia avoids any potential 
escalation of tensions in EU-Russian relations. The application of the middle power 
concept to Germany is justified by the fact that its “Energiewende” project – 
conceived nationally – is being promoted Europe-wide. Germany thus acts as an 
agenda setter in an area where other EU member states have not taken the initiative, 
allowing Germany to make use of its capacities and abilities. 
Similarly, in terms of supporting Eastern Partnership countries Germany 
appears not as a civilian power but as a trade state, that is, it supports cooperation with 
Eastern Partnership countries only to an extent that will not threaten German economic 
and trade interests in the region of Eastern Europe. Eastern Partnership countries are 
attractive to Germany; specifically, they attract German exports and investment; there 
is a perspective of economic growth and growth of domestic demand, they have cheap 
labour and are geographically close. 
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As far as cooperation in the security area is concerned, Germany prefers 
cooperation within the framework of European foreign and security areas and 
European defence policy, less so within the framework of Nato. Germany emphasises 
non-military forms of cooperation in projects such as Pesco and Framework Nations. 
Both of these were initiated by Germany and we can describe the country as an agenda 
setter and a middle power, in the sense that it was able and ready to initiate projects 
that correspond to its political and security interests. On the one hand, this allows 
Germany to make use of its available capabilities. On the other, the country can also 
demonstrate its ability to take more responsibility for the domains of defence and 
security – domains that are not key for the country’s foreign policy. The extent of 
German engagement takes heed of its specific requirements: it needs to win the support 
of its partners for implementing security and defence plans; it rejects commitments that 
are strictly military in character; and it advocates restraint when decisions are made 
about deploying armed forces in out of area operations. 
In two other disputed areas of cooperation – the refugee crisis and questions of 
the past – Germany also does not act as a civilian power. Rather the opposite: many 
experts and public opinion agree that Germany’s soft power has failed, that the civilian 
power concept is not applicable. In resolving the refugee crisis in particular, Germany 
acts as a middle power, as shown by its ambitions to push through a “willkommen” 
policy and compulsory quotas at the European level. This German behaviour can be 
seen as a manifestation of unilateralism.  
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